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ABSTRACT 
 
Low cost micro drip kit is being touted in South Asia and other developing countries 
by International Development Enterprises (iDE) with an objective to empower ‘poor’ 
smallholder farmers to invest their way out of poverty. ‘Success’ stories are told of the 
technology being adopted by farmers in India. With this assumption, the development 
of drip was replicated in Zambia without the much anticipated success. Thousands of 
low-cost drip kits were sold to targeted farmers but, after a few years, only few were 
still functional on farmers’ fields. Most of the farmers either did not use the technology 
or abandoned it after using it for a brief period of time. A number of social, economic, 
physical, technical as well as institutional challenges can explain this. This study 
reviewed conditions that characterized the success and challenges of drip in India 
and Zambia respectively, focusing on the technical configuration of drip systems in 
the latter. The authors argue that the drip technology was transferred from India to 
Zambia without the support system or network of organization that made it work in 
India thus imposing constraints on the use of the kit by farmers in Zambia. Few 
farmers who used the kit configured their drip systems by modifying its characteristics 
to overcome these constraints. The study concludes that the configuration of drip on 
farmers’ field was determined largely by farmer innovation, availability of spares and 
costs of drip equipment, profitability of markets, labour, system capacity and technical 
knowledge of farmers as well as the availability and depth of groundwater 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The past few decades have seen a revolution in the development and 
commercialization of new irrigation technologies such as automated canals and 
pressurized water delivery systems, surface and sub-surface drip irrigation 
technologies, automated sprinklers and highly sophisticated control systems 
developed to manage these new innovations. The design and development of these 
technologies were directed towards relatively large and sophisticated irrigation 
systems in developed countries populated by well-resourced farmers (Keller, 2004). 
However, the vast majority of the world’s farmers who live in developing countries 
(van Hofwegen & Svendsen, 2000) are resource poor and cultivate on small plots of 
less than two acres. They have been excluded of the use of these innovations by 
design and cost (Postel, 1996; Polak et al, 1997; Postel et al, 2001, Keller, 2004). 
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Although a small proportion of smallholder farmers may benefit from subsidized canal 
irrigation schemes by local governments, most are found in locations where these 
schemes are “too expensive or impractical to build” (Postel et al, 2001, p.4).  
In the face of increasing global population, water scarcity and the need to tackle 
poverty in developing countries, International Development Enterprises (iDE) took up 
the challenge to re-engineer conventional irrigation technologies with the explicit 
objective to meet the needs of smallholder farmers. These drip irrigation systems are 
characterized by low investment cost, rapid returns on investment, suitability for 
various small plots, simple operation and maintenance  (Polak et al, 1997; Postel et 
al, 2001; Keller, 2004). Technologies developed include low-cost plastic tanks for 
collecting and storing rainwater, pressure and suction treadle pumps for water lifting, 
low pressure sprinklers and drip emitters for efficient water application. Shifting from 
the traditional practice of simply ‘handing-out’ technological innovation to farmers, iDE 
adopts a “business approach” whereby farmers are supported so that they can invest 
their way out of poverty by increasing crop productivity and income from marketable 
surplus by means of: (1) water control, (2) private sector supply chain, and (3) 
profitable marketing of high-valued crops (Heierli & Katz, 2007; IDE, 2007).  
Krishak Bhandu (KB) or “farmers’ friend” in local Hindu parlance is a low-cost drip kit 
developed and promoted by iDE in India and other South Asian regions over the past 
decades. High adoption rates and widespread use of these kits have been reported 
(Heierli & Katz, 2007; IDE, 2007) leading to their promotion in Zambia and other 
African countries. The Zambian experience was however without the much 
anticipated success. An evaluation of iDE’s projects showed that thousands of low-
cost drip kits were sold to targeted farmers but few were found being used by farmers 
on their fields. Most of them either did not use the kit or abandoned it after using it for 
a brief period of time. The evaluation revealed that a number of social, technical, 
physical, and economic as well as institutional challenges were the bane on the 
unsuccessful replication of the ‘Asian’ success in Zambia (Tuabu, 2012a; 2012b). 
We focus on the configuration of drip-kits under different circumstances to review the 
conditions that contributed to the success of drip kits in India and the challenges to 
replicate the same in Zambia.  
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
We use the technological system perspective (Hughes 1983; 1987), social 
construction of technology (Pinch & Bijker, 1993; Bijker 1993) and the innovation 
theory (Reij & Waters-Bayer, 2001) to analyse how the KB drip was perceived as a 
success in India and how it apparently failed to work on the field of farmers in Zambia. 
By doing so, we adopt a sociotechnical approach whereby technology development is 
a social activity influenced and shaped by different social actors or forces that 
constitute the environment (or technological system) in which a technological artefact 
or object is being developed (Pinch & Bijker, 1993; William & Edge, 1996).  
Technological systems are developed by systems builders (inventor-entrepreneurs) 
mainly with an objective of solving problems (or correcting a reverse salient) to fulfil 
specific goals. In doing so they end up inventing technological objects or artefacts 
(Hughes, 1987; 1992). Technological objects do not work in isolation but are made to 
work by being part and parcel of already existing (or created) systems (Hughes, 1987; 
MacKenzie & Wacjman, 1999). Constraints however arise when relatively ‘new’ 
technologies are being integrated into existing systems and care must be taken they 
are designed to ‘fit’ in order to work (MacKenzie & Wacjman, 1999). This happens as 
a result of real confrontation between users and the technology who end up finding 
their way round to ‘de-scripting’, ‘reconfiguring’ and re-shaping the technology 
(Bolding, 2004). 
When technological objects are made to work, adopted and used, then they constitute 
innovations otherwise, they still remain an invention (Rosenberg 1982; Woodhill et al, 
2011). Hughes argued that whenever existing systems do not favour the production of 
innovations, system builders create their own conditions (or systems) with unique 
characteristics in which the artefacts or objects are adapted to make them work. He 
explained that although technological systems may differ from one setting to another, 
transfers are possible but constraints may arise when the object of technology is 
transferred without the systems or organizations that made them to work in their 
previously existing setting (Hughes, 1987, p. 66 – 68).  
METHODOLOGY 
Data for this paper were derived from three months of field work with iDE, iDE project 
partners and farmers as part of the International Development Research Centre 
(IDRC) sponsored project on “Gender Differentiated adoption of Low-cost Irrigation 
Technologies in Zambia” jointly implemented by International Development 
Enterprises (iDE) Zambia and Wageningen University and Research Centre. The 
process included semi-structured interviews and in-depth unstructured or open 
conversation with iDE staffs, project implementing, and farmers. Interviews helped in 
understanding the influences and contribution of different actors to the process of 
development of the low-cost drip at three levels: (1) iDE and its partners (also referred 
to in this paper as ‘technology input level’), (2) farmers (or ‘on-farm level’) and (3) 
market agents and traders (or ‘output level’). 
The main implementing partners of iDE are the Mennonite Economic Development 
Associates (MEDA) and international NGOs. These provide initial vouchers for 
farmers to purchase drip kits and treadle pumps and train microfinance institutions, 
which will eventually provide lending to farmers. Microfinance institutions involved are 
the Christian Enterprises Trust of Zambia (CETZAM) and Micro Bankers Trust (MBT). 
They provide loans to farmers to buy drip and other micro irrigation technologies 
(MTIs). Others actors involved are Cropserve, an agricultural input supply shop 
involved in the importation of KB drip from India in collaboration with iDE, enterprises 
or shops involved in the manufacture, import, supply and distribution MITs and iDE 
trained market agents.  
An ethnographic study was done of the history of the drip kit in Zambia, as well as 
case studies of farmer innovation involved in the configuration of different drip 
systems. Snowball sampling was used for identification of different categories of 
farmers who did not use drip, who abandoned the kit and who still used the 
technology.  Personal observation and field note book was used for the 
documentation of farmer innovations and field water management practices. The 
method of triangulation was used to crosscheck and verify data generated from iDE 
management staffs, iDE field officers and iDE partners as well as information from 
farmers and secondary data obtained from iDE Zambia.   
Data on the development of KB drip in India were obtained from a literature review, 
involving project documents from the iDE India website database, academic articles 
and documentary videos on micro irrigation technologies developed by iDE India. 
IDE PROJECT DESIGN 
iDE projects are said to be designed using the Prosperity Realized through 
Smallholder Markets (PRISM) methodology. PRISM is characterized by two main 
project activity phases i.e. formulation and implementation. Preceding the two phases 
however is an initial scoping activity to study targeted regions within a country to 
determine suitability for an intervention programme. After this, project formulation 
starts with detailed field activities such as boundary definition, market opportunity 
survey, constraints analysis, partnership development and intervention design (IDE, 
2003).  
Boundary definition is a continuous process of demarcation of areas of intervention 
within which smallholder market systems would be developed. This is followed by the 
identification of three to six market opportunities that have the potential to generate 
good income for farmers. iDE also conducts a sub-sector analysis of different crops, 
including the mapping of commodity chain followed by a gap analysis of business 
development services (BDS)3 at three levels: input/service supply4, on-farm5 and 
market output6 segments of the commodity chain.   
IDE looks for Business Development Services (BDS) partners who have the capacity 
to contribute complementary expertise in service provision such as facilitation and 
direct service provision (DSP) in the development of markets. Partner identification is 
carried out by conducting series of focus group discussions, interviews, market 
surveys, formal and informal discussions with farmers and key informants in the 
private sector, government and civil society (IDE, 2003, p. 18).  
Intervention strategies are designed to address priority constrains identified around 
factors such as technology, finance, capacity, information, policy and infrastructure at 
the levels of input, on farm and output markets. iDE expects that after five to six years 
of market intervention, smallholder farmers will be sufficiently integrated into market 
systems to make incomes amounting to $500 and more per year (IDE, 2003, p. 21). 
Implementation is the second phase of project design. This is determined by the 
outcome of project formulation. iDE’s role in project implementation is the 
establishment and maintenance of “platforms” upon which iDE partners can work to 
achieve target objectives of increasing income by $500 per year. This phase is also 
characterized by regular monitoring, reflection, feedback and evaluation to assess 
whether the goals and objectives are being met. The intervention is adapted, as 
needed, based on the learning generated from the evaluation (IDE, 2003; 2007). 
DESIGN AND PROMOTION OF KB DRIP IN INDIA 
Low cost drip kits were designed and promoted in India by IDE after series of trials 
and redevelopment of the micro tube drip (Polak et al, 1997) and Pepsee drip kit into 
the KB drip (Verma et al, 2004; WOCAT, 2007). The objective of this re-development 
was to develop a product that would fit the need of smallholder farmers and support 
them in managing scarce water resources, producing food for their families and 
selling marketable surplus for income. In this section, we review the conditions that 
contributed to the acclaimed success of drip in India, focusing on the organization of 
technological system support for the drip kit to work on the field of farmers.  
Here, ‘success’ is premised on actual adoption and use of the KB kit on the field of 
farmers. Conditions for success entailed a structure of support services made up of 
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local manufactures of drip, distributors, dealers of KB drip. These were further backed 
up by helpers, fitters (or village based mechanics) and IDE staffs who support farmers 
accessing, installing, maintaining and repairing the drip kits on their farms. 
At the input/service supply level, the development of KB drip was supported by a 
production and marketing channel made up of manufacturers, distributors and 
dealers. It is further supported by a marketing team made up of Manager, Business 
Supervisors and Business Associates (BAs). BAs were responsible for conducting 
and organizing the promotion of KB kits and providing support to KB dealers. They 
are paid fixed salaries and 4% commission of total sales on turnover by dealers (IDE, 
no date). These are partners of iDE who support the supply, installation and use of 
KB kit on the field of farmers. Dealers buy directly from distributors and supply to 
farmers. The kits are sold with a one year warrantee card to farmers and delivered to 
farmers fields (EQUITY FOUNDATION, 2010). A typical dealer employs about 2 to 5 
fitters and 8 to 10 helpers who install KB drip for farmers who cannot install the facility 
on their farms and are paid (IDE, no date). Dealers also carry out after sales services 
such as repairs and maintenance if farmers cannot do it themselves. Most farmers in 
India replace laterals of their kits almost every year (TERI, 2007; EQUITY 
FOUNDATION, 2010). Besides dealers, other village based mechanics and IDE staffs 
also help farmers with installation and other aftersales services (EQUITY 
FOUNDATION, 2010).  
Although farmers using KB experienced challenges such as laterals flying with strong 
winds, rat and ant bites among others, the support and other available services and 
opportunities for irrigation development (Merrey & Sally, 2008) in India support 
farmers to adapt, adopt and use KB drip at the farm level. 
At the output level of project intervention, iDE made attempts to understand farmers’ 
views on the KB drip; their perception, expectations as well as suggestions. Farmers 
made recommendations on problems they faced citing the modification of existing 
products or the introduction of new ones (EQUITY FOUNDATION, 2010). 
DESIGN AND PROMOTION OF KB DRIP IN ZAMBIA 
The development of drip in Zambia was premised on the positive experience acquired 
in India and other South Asian regions. Three donor funded projects namely the 
Practical Micro Irrigation Technology Development (PMIT) Programme funded by the 
World Bank (1997 – 2002), The Smallholder Market Creation (SMC) project funded 
by USAID (2003 – 2005) and the Rural Prosperity Initiative (RPI) project funded by 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006 
– 2015) played a pivotal role regarding the introduction of low-cost drip kit in Zambia. 
The development of low-cost drip was initiated in the first two projects, and later 
upscaled during the RPI project. The objective of the RPI was to assist 14,000 
smallholder farmers invest their way out of poverty in the first phase of the project 
(2006 – 2010) and 11,200 in the second phase (2011 – 2015) and raising their 
income by $300 a year through the sale of treadle pumps, low pressure sprinklers, 
small motorized pumps and low cost drip. The kits were promoted on the basis it 
allowed labour, cost, water savings and increased crop productivity. In the first phase 
of the project, over 4,000 drip kits were sold to farmers through a voucher program 
programme supported by the Mennonite Enterprise Development Associates 
(MEDA), an implementing partner of the RPI project. The KB kits were sold to farmers 
at discount prices after farmers had participated in training session on drip 
installation, maintenance and use organized by IDE field and technical staffs.  
‘Trained’ farmers receive discount vouchers and top up with their own savings or loan 
arrangement with collaborating microfinance institutions (MFIs) to buy the drip kit. The 
vouchers provided discount of 60 – 80% at different stages of the project. The 
voucher, however, only covers the purchase of part of the drip system namely main 
laterals, laterals, drippers and other accessories (joinery and water control). It 
however does not include an overhead tank. Farmers had to purchase it separately.  
The KB kit however did not experience the success much accorded to it in India. An 
evaluation of the first phase of the RPI project reported various constraints and 
challenges for farmers to use the kit. Most farmers abandoned the drip kit after having 
used it briefly for diverse socio-economic, physical, technical and organizational/ 
institutional reasons (Magwenzi, 2011; Tuabu 2012a; 2012b). 
Technical  
The main technical reasons why farmers did not use the drip kit were: (1) the farmers’ 
inability to purchase all the components of a drip system, and (2) their inability to 
configure their drip systems properly. Some farmers purchased only the subsidized 
drip kit (main lateral, laterals and microtubes) without the 200 litre tank sold 
separately by iDE. Others had all components required but could not install the 
components properly due to lack of technical competence even after having received 
some form of training from iDE. 
Our study revealed that farmers abandoned the KB kit due to: (1) unavailability of 
spare parts especially laterals that were damaged by rodents or weeding tools, (2) 
frequent clogging problems experienced due to presence of calcium deposits in 
groundwater and dirt accumulation, (3) uneven water distribution and their system 
‘blocking’ due to the ‘soft’ material nature of the kit especially on ‘not fairly levelled’ 
fields, (4) few cases where farmers experienced drudgery with the use of buckets to 
lift and fill overhead tanks as they did not have water lifting devices such as treadle or 
small, and (5) a unique case of a farmer who claimed the repeated filling of 200 litre 
tank to meet crop water need with a motorized pump was not cost effective.  
Physical  
Prevailing physical conditions on farmers’ fields also constrained the use of the KB 
kits. The material nature of the kit is such that it becomes soft and easily takes the 
shape of the field under high temperatures resulting in uneven water distribution. The 
light weight nature of the kit drip made them to be easily blown away by strong winds. 
Some farmers had challenges with low water yields as well as drawdown in their wells 
in the dry season. Although this condition only limited their production potential, most 
farmers who abandoned the kit experienced frequent clogging due to the presence of 
calcareous deposits in groundwater while others experienced build-up of green algae 
in their tanks (that were transparent).   
The selection of water lifting devices is determined by the depth of groundwater. 
Water at depths of 6m or less can be accessed by a bucket, pressure and suction 
treadle pump and a motorized pump. A depth more than 6m eliminates the pressure 
treadle pump which cannot lift water beyond 6m. Similarly, with depths of more than 
7m the suction treadle cannot function thus the farmer needs either a bucket, a 
motorized or submersible pump.  
Socio-economic 
Farmers who did not use their kits or abandoned them were not only constrained 
technically but socio-economically as well. Those who did not buy the overhead tank 
argued that they were expensive and could therefore not afford them. Farmers who 
used buckets in lifting water did not have the economic means to purchase a treadle 
pump or motorized pump. 
Market conditions were not conducive for farmers due to price fluctuations, untarred 
roads in the rainy season and high transport cost to distant markets. For some 
farmers, this caused production losses and subsequent dis-adoption of the kit 
(Borsboom, 2012; Tuabu, 2012a). 
Farmers who installed a complete drip system bought their kits using savings from 
sale of previous harvest (especially maize or vegetables) or loans from microfinance 
institutions. An interesting social condition that motivated some farmers to use the kit 
in some communities was the proximity of homestead and fields These farmers 
learned to configure and repair the drip from each other. Those who were not so 
‘technically’ inclined were helped by their fellows or hired labourers to set up their drip 
systems. It was however observed that communities where farmers where far away 
from each other had challenges using the drip kit.  
Organizational/institutional 
The decision to promote and support the dissemination of drip kits in Zambia did not 
emerge in-country but was rather pushed from outside, largely because of the 
positive imagery surrounding the technology as expressed by an iDE official: 
 “(…) to some extent, there was a push out there saying drip is a brilliant programme, 
you need to promote it (…) we are scoring highly from the numbers (or adoption of 
drip) and getting the technology out there (...). And we’ve been rushed to promote it 
(...). So we more or less convinced Cropserve (our implementing partner) that drip 
was a fantastic technology (...)” (Tuabu, 2012b, p.50).  
iDE Zambia was also operating on a ‘lean’ budget for the RPI project. According to an 
iDE official, budgetary allocation for the RPI was almost half the allocation to the 
previous SMC project. Under the SMC, iDE had more staffs and regional offices 
comprising a team of specialists such as agronomist, irrigation technician, a team 
leader with a background in business administration and field staffs. They were 
resourced enough to operate and provide better services to farmers. Under the RPI 
however, this setup was restructured. Most of the agronomists and irrigation 
engineers could not be employed anymore due to budgetary constraints leading to a 
loss in expertise regarding the design of the drip-kits (only 2 remained in the 
headquarter in Lusaka). Similarly, few field staffs were employed to promote, train, 
and sell micro irrigation technologies. The average field staff to farmer ratio is 1:2000, 
meaning they have little incentive –and means- to provide aftersales service. 
The four year allocated for the project was identified as another challenge hampering 
the adoption and use of the KB drip. Like for every development project, meeting 
targets was a primary criteria for evaluation by donors, leading iDE-Zambia to focus 
on aspects that would allow them to disseminate the 14,000 targeted kits as fast as 
possible such as promotional activities, subsidy systems and linkages to microfinance 
institutions. In their ‘hurrying’ quest, technology development processes like field 
testing and evaluation to ascertain whether the kit meets farmer’s use requirements 
were overlooked and limited attention was paid to input/supply chain, while these 
appeared crucial conditions to success in South Asia. Finally, after-sales services  
were not incorporated in the project – also due to lack of staff (see above). 
EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD: TECHNICAL (RE) 
CONFIGURATIONS OF LOW-COST DRIP SYSTEM 
The different constraints outlined above characterize the socio-technical environment  
in which low-cost drip kits are being developed in Zambia and hampered their 
adoption and use by farmers. However, some farmers who use drip kits on their farms 
overcame these challenges by reconfiguring the technological package promoted by 
iDE, based on their direct and daily encounter in “running” the drip systems. These 
are generally farmers who were influenced by model trained farmers whose 
responsibility is to train other farmers. They visit each other frequently to observe how 
their fellows overcome common problems they faced with the use of the kit. 
 
Due to the unavailability of spare parts, farmers devised innovative ways of dealing 
with damaged components of the drip kits by replacing them with elements from other 
drip packages available in the region (such as those of Netafim and Metzerplast) or 
local material. Some farmers repaired their drip kits by making clean cuts of laterals 
and joining them together using polyvinyl pipes. They secured the joints from leaking 
by wrapping polythene sheets round it, and tied ropes around them (Tuabu, 2012a.; 
2012b). Another adjustment was to tie the end of the drip lines with wooden pegs to 
keep them taut.  
A farmer who experienced frequent clogging and uneven water distribution on his 
field improved his filtering system by covering his tank with an old mosquito net. 
Another one who experienced draw down in water level to about 12 m deep dug a 
trench about 5 meters deep and 5 meters long near the well and punched a hole in 
the concrete lining the well to access water. Farmers also bought different types of 
tank than those promoted by iDE.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The low cost KB drip is reported to be a successful innovation in India where, at the 
input/supply service level, private sector actors involved in local manufacture, 
distribution and dealership supported its adoption and modification by farmers. There, 
drip kits were sold with one year warrantee to farmers and variants of the KB drip 
available on the market. Farmers were also provided with after sales and other 
services related to the repair, replacement and maintenance of their kits. At the output 
level, marketing conditions were favourable (Merrey & Salley, 2008). Finally, 
feedback mechanisms were put in place to evaluate the experiences of farmers in 
order to improve the KB products and services. 
In Zambia, the technological system in which KB drip kits was embedded was less 
conducive for the kits to be used sustainably on farmers’ fields. The object of the 
technology (i.e. the KB kit) was largely transferred with scant attention being given to 
replicate or adapt the support system that made it worked in India. At the input/supply 
service level, shops imported, stored and distributed drip kits. The kits were promoted 
by iDE field officers who “had to” convince farmers to purchase the kits due to the 
incentive structure (i.e. reaching targeted sales) that dominated the overall project. 
They did so by linking farmers to microfinance institutions. Little attention was given to 
after sales services to make sure the kits were tailored to farmers’ field conditions. 
Other conditions that hampered the use of drip kits were low local manufacturing 
capacity, the lack of support services for installation, repairs, spare parts and the lack 
of a warrantee system. Finally, output markets were not conducive enough and there 
was little feedback mechanisms to evaluate farmers’ experiences and adjust the 
approach accordingly. This can be seen as an example of lack of ‘fit’ between the 
technological object and the existing technological system. A few farmers however 
found their way round the challenges of the technological system by re-configuring 
the technical object (i.e. the drip kit). In the absence of after sales support, they 
configured their drip kits themselves or with the help of other farmers or experienced 
farm labourers who worked in commercial drip farms. Farmers repaired their kits or 
replaced them with other available technological packages and local materials such 
as tanks, rubber bands, wooden pegs etc. 
At an institutional level, and as is often the case in development projects, the 
incentive structure was strongly biased towards “reaching sales target” within a 
limited time frame (i.e. 4 years) rather than making sure that the sold drip-kits would 
be used sustainably on farmers’ fields – even beyond the project’s life time. iDE field 
staff focused on linking farmers to micro-credit institutions such as MEDA for buying 
the kits at discount prices or on loans, thus hampering the implementation of the 
business approach advocated by iDE. Finally, establishing attractive output markets 
proved to be a challenge, leading to disappointing financial results for the farmers and 
subsequent abandonment of the drip kits after a “trial” season.  
In conclusion, we argue that the life line for the reported success of KB kits in India 
was the “fit” between the socio-technical environment (i.e. the technological system) 
and the kits themselves (i.e. the technological object). In Zambia, a combination of 
social, economic, physical, technical as well as institutional constraints limited the 
scope for the kits to be used. However, few farmers who had preferential access to 
knowledge and support network found innovative ways to overcome these 
challenges. They did so by re-configuring the drip systems promoted by iDE thus 
constructing “hybrid systems”. These adjustments are similar in scope to those that 
were observed during the initial stage of drip-kits promotion in south Asia. Learning 
from farmer’s initiatives and establishing a system supporting these must become a 
priority if drip-kits are to fulfil their promises in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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